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The Courts, The State
Department and National
Policy: A Criterion for
Judicial Abdication
Professor Franck endorses the guiding principle of executive dominance in the conduct of foreign affairs, but contends that domestic courts confronted with questions of
international law have failed to develop a method for
determining when those questions should be decided in
conformity with executive-determined policy. He urges that
the courts may unnecessarily sacrifice private rights by
acceding too readily to legal positions suggested by the
executive in circumstances not affecting the national interest; and that on other occasions, by independently deciding
questions of internationallaw, the courts may undermine
importantaspects of nationalpolicy, compromisingpositions
taken by the executive. Professor Franck recommends that
in deciding questions of internationallaw in the context of
domestic cases, the courts should decide upon the degree
of deference to be given to executive recommendations by
determining whether any executive policy substantially
affecting the national interest is likely to be impaired by
the wrong decision.

Thomas M. Franck*
The guiding principle to be followed... is that the courts
should not so act as to embarrassthe executive arm in the
conduct of foreign affairs.'

I. THE PRoBLEM
Disorder, as it is known to the lawyer, is perhaps less frequently
an absence of legal order than a surfeit of it-the unrationalized,
un-co-ordinated grinding of a plethora of legal gears. This is par* Professor of Law, School of Law, New York University.
1. Weilamann v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 21 Misc. 2d 1086, 1088, 192 N.Y.S.2d
469, 471 (Sup. Ct. 1959). See also Republic of Mexico v. Hoffman, 824 U.S. 80,
85 (1945); Ex parte Republic of Peru, 818 U.S. 578, 588 (1948); United States v.
Lee, 106 U.S. 196, 209 (1882).
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ticularly true in the field of international law, where the postwar
development of international contact, impact and contract has
increasingly drawn domestic courts into cases which raise international issues emanating from a diversity of legal loci.
If the process of bringing order-of rationalizing and unsnarling
the tangled strands knotted into an "international case" -were
simply demanding of the judicial wisdom of a Solomon, it could be
safely entrusted to the domestic courts. However, that process frequently demands, in addition, the political genius of a Talleyrand,
for a judge must dispose of questions involving not only the private
rights of individual litigants, but also strands of law and policy
which emanate from the lego-political fabric of America's relations with foreign states. Where an issue is raised in the context of
litigation over private rights, but the case also affects problems of
international policy, the court is faced with an important questionto what extent may it independently decide the questions of international fact and law incident to the disposition of private rights,
and to what extent should the judicial Solomons defer to the Talleyrands of the State Department?
II. JUDICiAL

ABDICATION AND THE JuDICAL FUNCTION

Why, it may be argued,' must the courts address themselves
to issues of foreign policy in adjudicating private rights? Let
Talleyrand rule the political branches and Solomon the judiciary.
The Constitution has invested the judicial and political organs
with separate responsibilities and separate decision-making powers.
If, in the pursuit of their disparate functions, they may sometimes
appear to be in conflict, what of it? Such conflict is neither a source
of amazement nor of embarrassment when it occurs in the domain
of domestic order-creation. Certainly the possibility of occasional
conflict cannot be said to diminish the great constitutional principle
of government by a balance of powers.
Even in areas in which the balance of powers was constitutionally
contrived by a grant of co-ordinate jurisdiction, the judicial and political branches have occasionally accommodated each other by
abdicating from the exercise of a shared power. The refusal of the
President to inject the powers of his office into the battle over school
integration is an example of abdication from an issue which the
executive believed to be properly pre-empted by the courts. Con2. See, e.g., JAFmE, JUDICiAL ASPECTS OF FOREIGN RELATIONS (1933); Jessup,
Has the Supreme Court Abdicated One of Its Functions?, 40 Am. J. Ihqr'L L. 168
(1946).
3. See, e.g., Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116 (1958); Watkins v. United States, 354
U.S. 178 (1957); Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11 (1955). See also Chase, The Warren
Court and Congress, 44 MINN. L. REv. 595 (1960); Horn, The Warren Court and
the DiscretionaryPower of the Executive, 44 MrNN. L. REv. 639 (1960).
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JUDICIAL ABDICATION

versely, the courts, by characterizing disputes as political, have also
abdicated from certain issues in deference to the political process. 4
This technique of accommodation by abdication is probably not preconditioned so much by the traditional decision-making processes of
the political and judicial branches as by a desire to avoid the proof
tracted conflict which may result from a trespass by one branch
5
government into the sanctum sanctorum of another branch.
Whatever the validity of the reasoning underlying voluntary abdication from issues pertaining to domestic governance, there is better
reason for mutual consultation and forbearance between Talleyrand
and Solomon in issues with international implications. The Constitution establishes three separate branches of government, each of
which is encouraged to address itself in its own way to the American public with the force of law. International law, however, recognizes no such "division of powers." The law of nations is a law of
notions. It consists of the practiced opinions of states- and a state
which does not speak with a single voice or, at least, with a single
mind, cannot address itself effectively to any problem of international law.6
The importance of a state's speaking with a single voice is indicated by the pleadings of a recent case before the International
Court of Justice.1 To buttress Britain's claim to Minquiers and
Ecrehos, two small islands in the English Channel, the attention of
the court was directed to evidence that a British court had issued
a writ of quo warranto to an official on Ecrehos as early as the
fourteenth century, and that the official had responded. 8 Moreover,
the criminal jurisdiction of British courts had been extended to
the islands in 1826, 1913 and 1921V Similarly, British coroner's courts
4. See, e.g., South v. Peters, 339 U.S. 276 (1950); Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S.
549 (1946); Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433 (1939); Pacific States Tel. Co. v. Oregon, 223 U.S. 118 (1912); Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649 (1892); Luther v. Borden,
48 U.S. (7 glow.) 1 (1849).
5. This sentiment was expressed by Mr. Justice Frankfurter when he said with
respect to a suit to force reapportionment of state congressional districts: "To sustain
this action would cut very deep into the very being of Congress. Courts ought not
to enter this political thicket." Colegrove v. Green, supra note 4, at 556.
6. See, e.g., Norwegian Fisheries Case, [19511 I.C.J. Rep. 116, an excellent
example of the relation between state practice and international law, in which the
court stated:
although the ten-mile rule has been adopted by certain States, both in their
national law and in their treaties and conventions

. . .

other States have

adopted a different limit. Consequently the ten-mile has not acquired the
authority of a general rule of international law.
Id. at 131.
7. 1 MiNQUrms AND ECREHOS CASE-PLEADINGS, ORAL ARGUMENTS, AND DocUmENTs 75-92 (I.C.J. 1953). The judgments of domestic courts were also placed in
evidence (although for other reasons, with less success) in SovEiGNTY OVa
CERTA N FRoNTmR LAND, [1958-1959] I.C.J.Y.B. 100, 104.
8. 1 MNQUIES AND Ecnanos CAsE - PLEADINGS, OnAL ARGUMENTS, AND DocuimNTS 76 (I.C.J. 1953).
9. Id. at 79, 681-83.
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had taken jurisdiction in the islands in 1917, 1938 and 1948.10
Conversely, the British counsel was able to show that "there [was]
no evidence of the application of French law, there [was] no judgment of any French courts in respect of [the islands], or of anything
occurring in them or in relation to them." ' The court considered
this evidence to be of great importance, observing that throughout
the middle ages, "The King of England ...continued to exercise
his justice and levy his rights in the [is]lands. . . ." It is not too
much to say that the court, in granting Britain's claim of sovereignty
over the islands, found that the decisions of the British courts were
to be given decisive weight. 2 Quite obviously, a decision by a
British court that its jurisdiction did not extend to the islands would
have been telling evidence against Britain's claim of title.
This case illustrates that whatever the merits of the "dynamic
tension" between the judicial and political processes in domestic
forums, these merits may not persist in the international forum.
Solomon and Talleyrand should, in matters of international law
affecting the national interest, express their notions with a single
mind. This is not to say, however, that the courts must increasingly
sacrifice "justice" for the individual litigants to the higher purpose
of international legal consistency. A survey of the cases, evaluating
the truly pragmatic application of the above principle, indicates
that Solomon has sometimes abdicated to Talleyrand in disputes
which are really none of Talleyrand's concern. The courts are abdicating to ad hoc determinations of fact and law by the political
branches of government where no matters of internationallaw affecting the national interest could possibly be at stake and where
there is, consequently, no need for consistency in the decisional
processes of the various branches of government.
This Article is not intended to explore all of the areas of international law affected by the relation between the political and judicial
branches of government, 13 but merely to examine several of these
areas in order to illustrate a pragmatic technique for answering the
question-when should the courts and the State Department speak
with one mind, and when need they not?
A. Cases Involving Title to Territory
International law is still largely in what might be called its "common law" stage-a stage in which the notions and practices of
10. Id. at 80, 91.
11. 2 MNQuIERs Arm ECREHOS CASE -PLEADINGS,
u:ENTS 26 (I.C.J. 1953).

ORAL ARGvUM:ENTS, AND Docu-

12. Minquiers and Ecrehos Case, [1953] I.C.J. Rep. 47, 62, 67-68. Also see

SovmnEIoNTY OvEn CERTAIN FRONTim LAND, [1958-1959] I.C.J.Y.B. 100, 104.

13. For a general enunciation of additional areas of international law affected by
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states are a principal source of the law between nations. Evidence of
the practices of states is found in the behavior not only of the
political but also of the judicial organs of the state.14 Nowhere is
this more apparent than in the development of an international law
of real property or of title to territory.
The recent case of Cheng Fu Sheng v. Rogers 15 demonstrates the
international legal stakes that may be at issue in domestic litigation
which incidentally involves a question of title to territory. In this
case the Justice Department was attempting to deport a Chinese
alien to Formosa in accordance with a statute which authorizes
deportation to the alien's country of origin. 16 The Justice Department urged that Formosa was an appropriate destination because it
is part of the country of China. There was certainly evidence to
support the Justice Department's contention. The Chinese government recognized by the United States has established its capital on
Formosa and rules it as a part of China. Japan, the former owner,
had renounced all title to the island, thereby restoring the status
existing prior to its legal cession to Japan in the Treaty of Shimonoseki. Nevertheless, the federal district court regarded itself as
bound by a determination of the State Department that Formosa is
not, in this country's view of international law, a part of the country
of China.
This result, while frustrating the deportation proceedings on a
technicality, did safeguard an important international law posture
of the United States. When, inevitably, the United States extends
diplomatic recognition to the Chinese Communist regime, this
country will be able to rely upon a consistent legal contention
supporting a political doctrine of an independent Formosa (the doctrine of "two Chinas"), and it will be able to defend itself against the
otherwise undeniable allegation that continued American presence
on Formosa would constitute aggression against China in international law. 18
this relation, see REsATElmErr, FOREIGN RELATIONS LAw § 133 (Tent. Draft No. 3,
1959).

14. See notes 7-12 supra.
15. 177 F. Supp. 281 (D.D.C. 1959).
16. 66 Stat. 212 (1952), 8 U.S.C. § 1253(a) (1958).
17. Treaty of Peace With Japan, Sept. 8, 1951, [1952] 3 U.S.T. & O.I.A. 3169,
T.I.A.S. No. 2490, 136 U.N.T.S. 45; Treaty of Peace Between the Republic of China
and Japan, April 23, 1952, 138 U.N.T.S. 3. Art. IV of the latter treaty provided:
"It is recognized that all treaties, conventions and agreements concluded before

December 9, 1941, between China and Japan have become null and void as a
consequence of the war." Id. at 40. Thus, Japan renounced the dominion over
Formosa that it had acquired in the Treaty of Shimonoseki, April 17, 1895, art. 2,
para. (b), Inspector General of Customs, China, 2 TaEATIES BETWEEN CHINA AND
FOREIGN STATES 590 (2d ed. 1917), 1 FoREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES

199, 200 (1895).
18. If the United States recognizes the Peking regime as the government of
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Similarly, it was not timid abdication, but a desire to have
America speak with a single, clear mind on crucial issues of international law, which led a federal district court in another recent
deportation proceeding to adopt, without itself weighing the facts,
the position taken by the State Department that Okinawa belongs
to Japan."0 The court said that "the reasonable construction of treaty
terms by the State Department, acquiesced in by other signatory
powers, is entitled to great weight."20 Similarly, in an earlier case,
a federal district court, in ascertaining executive policy with respect
to the sovereign status of the government of South Africa, laid down
the sound rule that, where "the legislative or executive department
of the government of the United States has taken action regarding
the diplomatic or international status of any place or country, this
court is ordinarily bound by that action... . [The court] investigates the question presented, follows the decisions made by the
legislative and executive departments, where these decisions exist,
and, in their absence, decides for itself upon such information as it
deems most trustworthy." 21
In the face of such reasoning, there will be some who will remain
unconvinced that individual rights should be sacrificed even to the
high policy of international legal consistency. To them it must be reported that the courts, where they have decided issues of international territorial status "on the merits" without consulting the policy
and expertise of the State Department, have not shown substantially
greater skill at weighing the facts and evolving a consistent legal
theory than has the executive branch. This may be because the
"facts" of territorial status in international legal questions are so
policy-charged that it is difficult for any branch of government not
to view them through policy-tinted glasses. It is also because domestic courts venturing upon the waters of international law soon find
themselves adrift on a turbulent, uncharted sea, dotted very rarely
with solid precedents. With judicial recourse still largely a consensual process in international law, the number of facts which
international courts have classified for purposes of legal deductions
is far smaller than in domestic law. Thus the judicial process of
reasoning by analogy, which effects "consistency" and "justice," has
much less grist for its mill.
For example, in United States v. Rice,22 the United States Supreme Court, in interpreting custom and excise legislation, determined that an American city occupied by the enemy during the war
China - including Formosa- the continuing of military intervention on behalf of
the Nationalists would be an unlawful intervention or aggression.
19. United States v. Shiroma, 123 F. Supp. 145 (D. Hawaii 1954).
20. Id. at 149.
21. In re Taylor, 118 Fed. 196, 197 (D. Mass. 1902).
22. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 246 (1819).
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of 1812 thereby became a "foreign port" subject to the "sovereign
jurisdiction" of the occupying power.2 3 The Court also held, in
Luckenbach S.S. Co. v. United States,2" that the cities of the Panama Canal were "foreign ports" for purposes of a mail carriage law,
even though the Court had earlier expressed the view that the Canal
Zone was one of the "territories of the United States" and that "it is
hypercritical to contend that the title of the United States is imperfect, and that the territory described [Canal Zone] does not belong
to this Nation."25
Inconsistent judicial treatment of the status of leased foreign
bases provides another illustration of the difficulties involved in
developing consistent international theories in the context of domestic cases. In Vermilya-Brown Co. v. Connell,26 the Court determined for itself -against the advice of the State Department"1
that leased American bases in Bermuda were within the definition
"states, territories and possessions of the United States" used to
define the jurisdictional scope of the Fair Labor Standards Act.28
Shortly thereafter, the Court ruled that bases held under identical
leases in Newfoundland were within the act's definition of a "foreign
country" for purposes of the Federal Tort Claims Act 29 -much to
the surprise of the lower court which had thought Vermilya-Brown
to be "persuasive, if not well-nigh conclusive" of the status of the
Newfoundland bases.30
Aside from the disarray into which these decisions have thrown
the United States' international law position respecting the status
of these various leased bases, they have obviously evolved no
reasonably predictable standard for fact-evaluation. In each case
the Court has tried to guess what Congress meant by its use of very
specific terms of art applicable to the international law of real
property. Sometimes terms like "possession," "territory" and "foreign" have been given a meaning based on the international law
usage as understood by the courts. At other times the courts have
23. "By the conquest and military occupation of Castine, the enemy acquired
that firm possession which enabled him to exercise the fullest rights of sovereignty
over that place." Id. at 254. The narrow decision in the case did not, however,
warrant these words.

24. 280 U.S. 173 (1930).

25. Wilson v. Shaw, 204 U.S. 24, 33 (1907).
26. 335 U.S. 377 (1948).
27. "The arrangements under which the leased bases were acquired from Great
Britain did not and were not intended to transfer sovereignty over the leased areas
from Great Britain to the United States." Letter of the Legal Advisor of the State
Department, quoted in Vermilya-Brown Co. v. Connell, supra note 26, at 380.
28. 52 Stat. 1060 (1938), 29 U.S.C. § 1 (1958).
29. United States v. Spelar, 338 U.S. 217 (1949). See also Burna v. United States,
142 F. Supp. 623 (E.D. Va. 1956), in which the Federal Tort Claim Act was held
inapplicable to Okinawa.
30. Spelar v. United States, 171 F.2d 208, 209 (2d Cir. 1948).
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interpreted the same terms as having mere lay connotation. Moreover, the courts have frequently applied these terms in the light of
evidence, not of territorial status, but of congressional intent. In the
Luckenbach case, for example, the Court did not concern itself at all
with the treaties upon which the United States' claims to the Canal
Zone are based. Rather, the Court proceeded entirely on a finding
that the "foreign" rates for mail-carriage had always applied to the
Canal Zone and that Congress could not be presumed to have intended to alter this arrangement.31
It is by no means certain, therefore, that the domestic court is
per se better equipped than the State Department or the Congress
to achieve "justice" or "consistency" by exercising its right to make
its own fact-classifications and draw its own legal deductions in
these cases. Too frequently, the courts have not concerned themselves at all with the international law which they are inevitably
making, and have decided issues on parochial findings of "congressional intent." At other times they have merely substituted their
own international "policy" for that of the State Department or
Congress. Such performance may result in the sacrifice of a consistent international legal posture. If Congress intends that the Fair
Labor Standards Act should apply to employment relations at the
Bermuda bases, Congress should amend the statute. The courts
should not amend it by torturing Congressional meanings. Nor
should the courts be compelled-by Congressional imprecisionto embarrass the State Department by an act of judicial annexation.
If Chinese aliens must be deported to Formosa, let the legislation
make their port of departure, and not merely their country of origin,
be deported, as under former enactthe place to which they may
32
ments of the same statute.

The courts ought to be using their powers to compel Congress to
draft its legislation with as much attention to the meaning of
international legal terminology as it gives to the terminology of
contract or agency. "I am satisfied," said one court in a rare display
of determination, "that Puerto Rico is no longer a Territory in the
sense that the term is used in the Constitution and the cases. Therefore, if the Congress of the United States proposes in the future to
make a statute applicable in Puerto Rico, I believe that, generally
speaking, it will have to make it so other than by the use of the
term 'Territory.'"33
Most matters touching upon title to, or status of, territory fall
within the "matters of international law affecting the national in31. Luckenbach S.S. Co. v. United States, 280 U.S. 173, 182-83 (1930).
32. Act of Feb. 5, 1917, ch. 29, § 20, 39 Stat. 890.
33. Cosentino v. Local 1585, International Longshoremen's Ass'n, 126 F. Supp.
420, 422 (D. P.R. 1954).
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terest" in which a co-ordinated political and judicial posture is of
great importance. Some matters, however, do not; and yet the courts
have not always in these cases felt themselves free to proceed with
their own determinations. For example, in deciding whether certain
goods shipped from Puerto Rico in 1898 fell within the scope of
customs legislation, it was necessary for the Court of Claims to
determine whether the goods were "from a foreign country." The
decision was not rendered until 1914. Nevertheless, the court examined the policy of the State Department as it was in 1898 and found
that, although Puerto Rico had, at the time of shipment, been occupied by the United States and that a peace treaty had been signed
which made provision for its annexation, the treaty had not yet been
ratified. Thus, the court considered itself obliged to conclude that
the goods had been shipped from a "foreign country."34
Clearly, the national policy or interest of the United States in the
legal status of Puerto Rico had, by 1914, been fully vindicated and
had become moot. The court could certainly have afforded to determine the issue on the private merits alone. Moreover, even in 1898
a judicial determination that Puerto Rico was no longer foreign
territory could not have done anything but strengthen the American
international legal claim to "equitable inchoate" or "contingent"
title. Here was a case in which the court could well have afforded
to determine the issue of the status of territory for itself; for, whatever decision it might have reached, it could have done no harm to
an international legal interest of the United States. It is not enough
that an issue before a court raise a question of international law to
justify a court's abdicating its determinative function in that matter.
The court must be convinced that only one of the several conclusions it might reach would protect an established American posture
in international law.
This pragmatic distinction was not overlooked in a recent British
case, Ex parte Mwenya,35 in which the Court of Appeal held that
habeas corpus ran from an English judge to public officials in the
"protectorate" of Northern Rhodesia. Even though the Crown had
urged the court to follow the parliamentary determination that a
protectorate is "a place outside Her Majesty's Dominions," 36 the
judges refused to be bound by this technicality because they had
before them ample evidence that Britain was, both in fact and under
international law, in full sovereign possession of Northern Rhodesia.
Could the Crown prove a national interest in the notion that
Northern Rhodesia was, under tenets of international law any the
34. Lascellas v. United States, 49 Ct. CL. 382 (1914).
35. 3 Weekly L. R. 767 (C.A. 1959).
36. Foreign Jurisdiction Act, 1890, 53 & 54 Vict. c. 37; 3 & 4 Geo. 5, c. 16 (1913).
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less subject to British jurisdiction than any colony? It could not;
indeed, the contrary was the case, and the court acted accordingly.
The Mwenya case also affords another example of a situation in
which courts should refuse to abdicate from the determination of
international law issues. The Crown, in Mwenya, not only sought
to advise the court -it was also the defendant in the action. It may
be true that- as Cheng Fu Sheng demonstrates -the
executive
does not always act or speak with a single interest in international
cases.3 7 Neverteless, in cases in which the executive branch of the
government is a party, courts-like the Mwenya court-should
treat executive determinations with lively skepticism, unless it can
be shown that those determinations were made before contemplation of the existing controversy.3"

B. Cases Involving the Right to Sue
Whereas the status of particular territory is the concern of the
international law of real property, the right to sue constitutes an
international chose in action and thus raises questions under the
international law of personal property. It may be that in international law, as in domestic law, litigation affecting the status of
personal property arouses less passion than most litigation affecting the status of realty. Nevertheless, the right of foreign sovereigns to sue in the domestic courts is a prize the awarding or
withholding of which is an international law problem frequently
charged with important considerations of national policy. This is
true not so much because of the monetary value of the chose in
action but because a determination that a particular national government may pursue an action in an American court is a form of
judicial recognition of the legal status of that claimant in international law. Again, it is important to emphasize the behavioral,
notional, or common law aspect of contemporary international law.
Whether a particular politico-geographical agglomeration constitutes a state or a government in international jurisprudence depends,
in practice, on whether a substantial number of the states, which
are the "persons" of the international law community, recognize it
as such. No state can effectively speak with a divided mind in
making such a determination.
With respect to the right to sue, the law appears to be clear in
this country. Just as an agglomeration of directors and stockholders
may invest a corporation with the capacity to bring an action in the
87. Cheng Fu Sheng v. Rogers, 177 F. Supp. 281 (D.D.C. 1959). See also text
accompanying note 15 supra.
38. See, e.g., United States v. Shiroma, 128 F. Supp. 145, 148-49 (D. Hawaii
1954). In the Shiroma case, the advice of the State Department was based on a
policy statement made much earlier, at the San Francisco Peace Conference by
John Foster Dulles. Id. at 148.
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courts only after incorporation by legislative and executive fiat, so
a foreign regime and its subjects have capacity to bring a representative action in the name, or on the behalf of a state only after
its status has been verified by the executive act of recognition."
"[T]he question of sovereignty is a political question, the determination of which by the political branch or branches of our government
. . . binds the judicial department." 40

The courts' understandable reluctance to undermine the position
of the United States as regards the legal status of a foreign political
entity has not, however, precluded them from enabling these entities to carry on commercial and other "non-sovereign" functions
in this country. Thus, both the Russian Volunteer Fleet41 and Amtorg,42 (The Soviet State Trading Agency) were permitted to main-

tain actions in their own name even though they were, at the time,
43
wholly-owned agencies of an unrecognized Soviet government.
The case of Amtorg Trading Corp. v. United States 44 is particularly interesting because it illustrates the correct application of the
pragmatic test of state interests -with its restrictive implications in an international law matter. The State Department had intervened to show that the Amtorg Trading Corporation was in substance the Soviet government and that it should, accordingly, be
denied standing as a plaintiff. However, this advice was rejected by
the court. The national policy pursued by the State Department in
its intervention was not based upon precepts of international law,
but was designed to exert economic pressure. Recognition of the
status of the Soviet government was therefore not at stake in the
litigation. The sole concern of the State Department was to block
39. There is only one reported case of an unrecognized government being allowed
to sue in a United States court. See Consul of Spain v. The Conception, 6 Fed. Cas.
359, 360 (No. 3137)(C.C. S.C. 1819) (dictum), rev'd on other grounds, 19 U.S.
(6 Wheat.) 235 (1821). See also 17 Am. J. INT'L L. 742 (1923).
40. Agency of Canadian Car & Foundry Co. v. American Can Co., 253 Fed. 152,
155 (S.D. N.Y. 1918), aff'd, 258 Fed. 863, 368 (2d Cir. 1919). See also, Lehigh
Valley R.R. v. State of Russia, 21 F.2d 396, 400 (2d Cir. 1927); The Penza, 277 Fed.
91, 92-94 (E.D. N.Y. 1921); The Rogdai, 278 Fed. 294, 296-97 (N.D. Cal. 1920);
Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic v. Cibrario, 120 Misc. 256, 260, 139
N.E. 259, 262 (Ct. App. 1923). It should be noted that in the event of a conflict
between official recognition and a State Department suggestion made in good faith,
the latter has been held to be decisive. See Japanese Cov't v. Commercial Cas. Ins.

Co., 101 F. Supp. 243 (S.D. N.Y. 1951).
41. See Russian Fleet v. United States, 282 U.S. 481 (1931).

42. See Amtorg Trading Corp. v. United States, 71 F.2d 524 (C.C.Pa. 1934).

43. But cf. Royal Norwegian Navy v. David Smith Steel Co., 185 Misc. 880, 58
N.Y.S.2d 705 (Sup. Ct. 1945). Also note that the relationship between the agency
and the unrecognized government must not be such as to preclude the court from
finding a separate corporate personality. See, e.g., Russian Socialist Federated Soviet
Republic v. Cibrario, 120 Misc. 256, 139 N.E. 259 (Ct. App. 1923) and Preobazhenski v. Cibrario, 199 App. Div. 899, 192 N.Y.S. 275 (Sup. Ct. 1922).
44. 71 F.2d 524 (C.C. Pa. 1934).
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the Soviet government from doing business effectively in the United
States. This objective could have been pursued by the political
branch through its own process- by legislation excluding Soviet
corporations. The court quite rightly refused to deny to a legally
incorporated entity the benefits of the fifth amendment of the
Constitution after that entity had been admitted to the lawful
pursuit of commercial activity in this country. The judiciary may
need to defer to the State Department in the determination of certain issues of international law; but the courts ought not to be
asked to decide cases devoid of international legal implications on
the basis of a State Department economic or political policyunless, of course, that economic or political policy has previously
assumed the form of law.
Judicial vigilance is always needed to prevent abuse of the working relationship between the courts and the State Department.
Nevertheless, the judiciary should remain ready to cooperate by
abdicating from deciding national policy in cases which raise bona
fide questions of international law. What happens when this cooperation breaks down is illustrated in the recent litigation in Bank
of China v. Wells Fargo Bank & Union Trust Co.4 5 The Bank of
China sought to draw upon funds it had deposited with Wells
Fargo. Because voting control of the stock of the Bank of China
belonged to the Chinese government, both the Nationalist and the
Communist governments had elected rival boards of directors for
the bank. In 1950, when the Nationalist directors attempted to
withdraw funds, the Communist directors intervened, and Wells
Fargo sought the protection of judicial resolution of the conflicting
claims. Even though the plaintiff in this action was not a government, but a state-controlled corporation, the case differed from the
Amtorg and the Russian Volunteer Fleet cases in that the court
was, in essence, asked to judge between the legitimacy in international law of the two rival Chinese governments which claimed the
controlling stock-interest. Nevertheless, the court refused to be
bound by the recognition policy of the State Department and
determined for itself that the Nationalist administration "is not now,
and may never again be, in a position to speak for the Chinese
people . . ., and refused to "recognize" the right of the Nationalist directors to draw on the account. On the other hand, the court
did not think that the Communist government was sufficiently
established, so the funds were, in effect, frozen pending a later
determination.
45. 92 F. Supp. 920 (N.D. Calif. 1950).
46. Id. at 923.
47. Id. at 924.
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Action was recommended the following year.4 This time the
court found that the dust had settled sufficiently for it to perceive
two co-existing Chinese governments and two Banks of China. In
choosing between them, the court stoutly declaimed that it would
not allow an "expression of executive policy to usurp entirely the
judicial judgment . . ."49 and that "the decisions . . . reveal no

rule of law obliging the courts to give conclusive effect to the acts
of a recognized government to the exclusion of all consideration of
the acts of an opposing unrecognized government." 50 An executive
determination of this sort is merely a "fact which properly should
be considered and weighed along with the other facts before the
court." 5 '
Having thus proclaimed its independence, the court concluded
on the evidence that
here, there co-exist two governments, in fact, each attempting to further,
in its own way, the interests of the State of China, in the Bank of China.

It is not a proper function of a domestic court of the United States to
attempt to judge which government best represents the interests of the
Chinese State in the Bank of China. In this situation, the Court should
justly accept . . . that government which our executive deems best able
52
to further the mutual interests of China and the United States.

Such a rationalization sacrifices candor for sophistication. Either
the court accepts the determination of the State Department for
the sake of international legal consistency and defers to the expertise
of the political arm of the government, or it weighs all the evidence
itself and reaches its own objective determination. How can the
subjective, aspirational, policy-dictated international law notions
of the State Department be weighed against objective evidence of
the actual conditions of government in China? Surely a court really
seized of all the facts and really making a judicial determination
without reference to executive policy could not reasonably have
concluded that there are today two effective, equal governments of
China. 3 Far better for a court honestly to defer to the political
branch in such matters of high international policy than to leave
itself open to the charge of conducting a hypocritical polemic for
the sake of appearing to retain full powers of determination.
48. Bank of China v. Wells Fargo Bank & Union Trust Co., 104 F. Supp. 59,
63 (N.D. Calif. 1952).
49. Ibid.
50. Id. at 64.

51. Ibid.
52. Id. at 66.
53. This is especially true since Formosa is not considered to be a part of China.
See Cheng Fu Sheng v. Rogers, 177 F. Supp. 281 (D.D.C. 1959), discussed in text
accompanying note 15 supra.
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C. Cases Involving Sovereign Immunity
The judicial practice is not quite as clear in defining the respective roles of the courts and the State Department in matters of
foreign sovereign immunity as in the related issue of the right to
sue. Like the right to sue, the right to immunity is dependent
upon executive recognition of a foreign state or governmenta determination of major consequence in international law. Most
courts agree with the New York Supreme Court that "the policies
of the Department of State with respect to immunity of foreign
nations and their property from local litigation are supreme."54
Occasionally, however, courts have appeared to deviate from the
rule. The best-known example of such deviation was the 1923 case
of Wulfsohn v. Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic,5 5 in
which the New York court ostensibly held that the then unrecognized Soviet government was entitled to sovereign immunity. Since,
however, neither the act complained of, nor the property involved
had its situs in the United States, the court could and should have
achieved the same result by declining jurisdiction without reaching
the question of immunity. Two other cases, in which the property
at issue was in this country, appear upon cursory examination to
have resulted in an independent judicial determination of the issue
of sovereign immunity.,6 Both involved a short-lived counterrevolutionary regime in Russia. Both contain language indicating
independent judicial recognition of that government. In one case
the court said that the revolutionary government only "existed for
a short time in the southern part of European Russia and was not
recognized by the government of the United States as either a
de facto or a de jure government. ... "57 Nevertheless,
during its life no enforceable right or remedy in the courts of this country
existed against that de facto government, for it could not be required
to submit itself to our laws and to the jurisdiction of our courts. This is

true irrespective of whether or not such government were recognized by
the government of the United States." 58

Despite these brave words, however, both courts sought refuge
in ambivalence. One court took the position that the counter-revolutionary government "when extinguished by conquest . .

.

became,

54. Weilamann v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 21 Misc. 2d 1086, 1088, 192 N.Y.S.2d
469, 471 (Sup. Ct. 1959).
55. 234 N.Y. 372, 138 N.E. 23 (Ct. App. 1923).
56. Voevodine v. Government of the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces
in the South of Russia, 232 App. Div. 204, 249 N.Y.S. 644 (1931); Nankivel v.
Omsk All-Russian Gov't, 237 N.Y. 150, 142 N.E. 569 (1923).
57. Voevodine v. Government of the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces
in the South of Russia, supra note 56, at 205, 249 N.Y.S. at 646.
58. Id. at 206, 249 N.Y.S. at 647. (Emphasis added.)
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so far as its corporate existence was concerned, as if it had never
existed."" 9 Moreover, said the other court, the counter-revolutionaries were either "a de facto government, and, therefore, sovereign
in character, or . . . a mere aggregation of robbers and murderers,

outside the protection of the laws of war."60 Thus, in concluding
that the defendants could not be sued, these courts presented three
possible explanations of the legal status of the counter-revolutionary
regime: (1) that the defendants never formed a government; (2)
that a government had been formed but no longer existed at the
time the action was brought; (3) that a government had been
formed and was entitled to sovereign immunity. Each of these
explanations is commensurate with the same legal result: "Whether
alive or dead, no valid judgment could be obtained against [the
alleged 'government']." 6 '
In virtually every other instance, the courts have adopted the
recognition policy of the executive in disposing of claims of immunity advanced on behalf of foreign governments, their agents or
property rights. Indeed, the practice suggests that the courts may
be excessively self-effacing when confronted by determinations of
the State Department which go beyond the maintenance of an
essential position in international law.
The manner in which the courts should deal with claims of
sovereign immunity was prescribed by the United States Supreme
Court in Ex parte Muir.2 It is obviously not enough that the foreign
sovereign allege immunity for itself, its servants, or property. Where
the foreign government itself is a party, the courts may rely upon
the fact of recognition or nonrecognition, and special advice frequently is not necessary. However, where the issue before a
court affects the status of the property or personnel of the foreign
government, the court must seek a special executive certification
explaining63 the legal status of the specific person or property
involved.
59. Ibid.
60. Nankivel v. Omsk All-Russian Gov't, 237 N.Y. 150, 156, 142 N.E. 569, 570
(N.Y. County Ct. App. 1923). (Emphasis added.)
61. Ibid. However, the Supreme Court of New York has cited these cases to
support a contention, itself irrelevant to the issue before it (the sovereign immunity
of a hostile but recognized foreign government) that "our courts hold that lack of
diplomatic recognition does not affect . . . immunity." Telkes v. Hungarian Nat'l
Museum, 265 App. Div. 192, 196, 38 N.Y.S.2d 419, 423 (1942). In Frazier v.
Foreign Bond Holders Protective Council, 283 App. Div. 44, 125 N.Y.S.2d 900
(1953y, the court interpreted the recognition of Hungarian sovereign immunity in the
Telkes case to turn on political recognition of the Hungarian government and not
on the authority of cases in which unrecognized governments could not be sued. Id.
at 48, 125 N.Y.S.2d at 903.
62. 254 U.S. 522 (1921).
63. Id. at 538. For a definitive study of the State Department "certification of
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It is in the certification cases that the danger of unwarranted
executive usurpation arises. In Ex parte Peru,64 for example, the
Peruvian government, alleging immunity for one of its vessels,
persuaded the State Department to send a certification to the court
stating: "This Department accepts as true the statements of the
Ambassador concerning the steamship Ucayali, and recognizes and
allows the claim of immunity."65 The court thereupon held itself
barred from any further examination of the case. "Upon the submission of this certification to the district court, it became the court's
duty, in conformity to established principles, to release the vessel
and to proceed no further in the cause." Il
This represents quite unnecessarily broad abdication. Most cases
require determination of several distinct matters, some of which are
quite inappropriate to informal ex parte proceedings before an
officer of the State Department, for they have nothing to do with
national notions of international law. For example, in Compania
Espanola v. Navemar,67 the immunity of a Spanish vessel was at
issue. The vessel had been ordered appropriated to the public
service by the Spanish Republican Government. However, it was
alleged that the Spanish Republican Government, by failing to take
the necessary physical possession, had failed to establish its title.
In determining the status of the property, the court was confronted with three separate issues: diplomatic recognition of the
Republican Government; applicability of the concepts of sovereign
immunity to this type of property (a merchant vessel); and the
validity of the Republican Government's claim of title in light of its
doubtful possession of the vessel.
Whatever primacy the State Department ought to enjoy in the
determination of the first and second of these issues, the third is
clearly a matter which ought to have been determined by the court.
had been
The question whether seizure of the vessel by the crew
"an act of or in behalf of the Spanish Government" 68 was an issue
to be determined by the domestic law of constructive possession and
agency. Yet the court thought that "if the claim is recognized and
allowed by the executive branch of the government, it is then the
duty of the courts to release the vessel .

.

"6 without further

inquiry.
immunity" procedure, see Feller, Immunity of Foreign States in Courts of the
United States, 25 Am. J. Ir'L L. 83 (1931).
64. 318 U.S. 578 (1943).
65. Id. at 581.
66. Id. at 589.
67. 303 U.S. 68 (1938).
68. Id. at 72.
69. Id. at 74. However, this statement was dictum, because the State Department did not, in this particular case, issue a certification of immunity. Where the
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Such judicial abdication is open to objection. The State Department ought to be confined to determining matters of international
law that affect the national interest. The question of who is lawfully
in possession of a ship is, on its face, not such a matter. No evidence
of a policy-determined notion of international law relating to constructive possession was advanced by the executive.
In the course of litigation, the State Department has properly,
and in accordance with the dictates of its international legal philosophy, certified whether a diplomat is "on the list,"

Nations,7 1 the

70

an accredited

delegate to the United
representative of a recognized
2
7 or an accredited official of an international agency
overnment,
and
the purpose
for which he is accredited). 7 3 When a foreign
government claims ownership of property the State Department
should also convey the executive decision respecting recognition
of that government by the United States. It may also advise the
court as to what position the United States has assumed in international law with respect to the kinds of governmental property
which are entitled to sovereign immunity.74 The State Department should not, however, purport to decide cases. It should
not withdraw from the courts such questions as the identity of
parties, the occurrence of certain alleged events, or the interpretation of domestic statutes relevant to the determination of the case. 5
Such limitations upon the effective scope of State Department
certifications are necessary to restrict the development of quasijudicial, ad hoc, non-adversary procedures within the State Department. The State Department should certify only as to fact-deductions with international law implications. Sometimes, in the absence
of other elements in the case, the position taken by the State Departexecutive has not explicitly made a determination, courts remain free to decide this
issue for themselves. See, e.g., Hanes v. Roumania Monopolies Institute, 260 App.
Div. 189, 20 N.Y.S.2d 825 (1940); Lamont v. Travelers Ins. Co., 281 N.Y. 862,
24 N.E.2d 81 (1939). Nevertheless, the courts will examine sympathetically any
general declarations of international legal policy made by the State Department
without reference to a particular case. See, e.g., Republic of Mexico v. Hoffman,
324 U.S. 30 (1945).
70. See Haley v. State, 200 Md. 72, 88 A.2d 312 (1952). The "list" is a State
Department register of persons entitled, by congressional enactment, to judicial
immunity because of their diplomatic employment or relation. See REv. STAT. §§
4063-66 (1875), 22 U.S.C. §§ 252-54 (1958). For an excellent discussion of the
"list" and the statute, see Trost v. Tompkins, 44 A.2d 226 (D.C. Munic. Ct. App.
1945).
71. See Tsiang v. Tsiang, 194 Misc. 259, 86 N.Y.S.2d 556 (Sup. Ct. 1949).
72. Ibid.
73. See United States v. Coplon, 88 F. Supp. 915 (S.D. N.Y. 1950).
74. See 26 Da,'T STAT BuL.rL. 984 (1952).
75. In United States v. Coplon, 84 F. Supp. 472 (S.D. N.Y. 1949), the court, in
effect, allowed the State Department to make an ad hoc determination of the meaning of the Immunities Act, 59 Stat. 669 (1945), 22 U.S.C. § 288 (1958). See also
United States v. Coplon, 88 F. Supp. 915, 920 (S.D. N.Y. 1950).
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ment will be virtually conclusive- but that conclusion, too, must
be drawn by the courts. Moreover, the State Department's certifications should be binding upon a court only where they effectuate
an established international legal contention advanced by the
United States with reasonable consistency. This would be an
effective working test of whether the substance of a State Department certification is really a matter of international law affecting
the national interest. Where no policy-determined legal posture is
likely to be infringed, all other legal deductions and conclusions
-including questions of international law- must be left to the
courts to determine on the basis of their own evaluation of the
evidence.
These distinctions were apparent to the courts of an earlier
period. In The Ambrose Light,76 an armed ship in the service of a
Colombian rebel movement had been seized by a United States
naval vessel, and a court had to determine whether it could lawfully
be confiscated as prize. Resolution of this question in turn depended
upon whether the owners of the ship were to be accorded the status
of an immune belligerent government or were to be treated merely
as "pirates." In an ad hoc determination made after the case had
arisen, the State Department "certified" that the insurgents "had
not been recognized by the United States as belligerents." 77 The
court, however, refused to follow this suggestion. Instead, it relied
upon evidence that the State Department, on the very day the Ambrose Light was seized, had sent a note to the Colombian government declaring the United States a "neutral" and refusing to honor
a closure of the Colombian ports unless the blockade could be made
effective 78 - a legal position evidencing United States recognition
of a state of belligerency and inconsistent with the subsequent
ad hoc certification.
The decision in The Ambrose Light turned on facts which, on
their face, arouse judicial caution. In such cases the interest of the
executive as a party to the action will at once lead the court to suspect that a suggestion is motivated less by considerations of national
policy in a matter of international law than by a desire to justify an
official action of the executive branch. Even without the likelihood
of executive self-interest, however, the courts should still be wary.
If a matter of international law is of national concern, the fact
ought to be evidenced by a precedent general determination-a
statement of law made before the event-by the executive or
Congress. The courts should normally accept nothing less. Moreover, the courts should determine the effect and relevance of that
76. 25 Fed. 408 (S.D. N.Y. 1885).
77. Id. at 443-44.
78. Id. at 444.
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general determination in the specific circumstances and weigh it
together with determinations of all the other issues in the case.
Insistence by the State Department on an international legal principle or legal fact originally devised for purposes of specific litigation ought generally to be viewed with reservation. If such a nationally-important legal precept is involved, why, the court should ask,
was it not enunciated earlier, in abstracto?
D. Cases Involving the Status of Hostilities
Executive and legislative determinations of the state of hostilities
are brought to bear on adjudications involving such terms as "war,"
"neutrality" and "armistice."
Of these terms, the most complex is "war," for it has not only
international but also constitutional law meanings, as well as general
connotations for the layman which do not necessarily coincide with
either of the other two. It may well be, as a court recently pointed
out, that "under our present membership in the United Nations, a
declaration of war by the Congress is no longer necessary in order
to commit our armed forces to combat." 79 Consequently, it may
follow that the term is becoming obsolete in constitutional usage,
and that it is being replaced by such concepts as "police action" and
"collective self-defense." Nevertheless, the term is still widely used
in statutes, treaties, and private contracts.
In interpreting the term "war," a court may choose to adopt the
international law definition-which much more frequently coincides with the "popular" than with the constitutional concept. Thus,
during hostilities in Korea, a court might properly have found that
the United States was at "war" in both the international sense and
the "popular" sense in spite of the absence of any formal (constitutional) declaration of war. Similarly, it would have been permissible
for a court to find that the United States was no longer at war with
Germany even prior to the joint resolution of Congress of October
19, 1951, which terminated the state of war with Germany.80
Serviceable definitions of both the "popular" and the "international law" meanings of war are found in New York Life Ins. Co. v.
Bennion: 1
When one sovereign nation attacks another with premeditated and deliberate intent to wage war against it, and that nation resists the attacks with
79. Miele v. McGuire, 53 N.J. Super. 506, 612, 147 A.2d 827, 830 (L.1959).
80. Joint Resolution To Terminate the State of War Between the United States
and the Government of Germany, 65 Stat. 451 (1951). An excellent discussion of
this point may be found in KELsoN, PRmNCILEs oF INTERNATIONAL LAw 67-71
(1952). The act of accepting an unconditional surrender is incompatible in international law with a continuing state of war.
81. 158 F.2d 260 (10th Cir. 1946).
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all the force at its command, we have war in the grim sense of realwait for
ity. . . . To say that courts must shut their eyes to realities and
82
formalities, is to cut off the power to reason with concrete facts.

The State Department, because it is part of the executive branch
is uncomfortably committed to the constitutional definition of the
term "war" and rarely intervenes to suggest a definition based on
the realities of international law. This is because the interest of the
executive branch in continuing, as a constitutional fiction, a war
which has obviously ended, or in ignoring the existence of a war
which is obviously raging, is generally greater than any international
legal interest. Occasionally, however, such intervention does occur,
as when the State Department, in Japanese Gov't v. Commercial
Casualty Ins. Co.,88 asked the court to. prevent the status of Japanese-American relations in 1949 from being determined by technical
reference to the constitutional definition of war. Had the court found
that the absence of a constitutionally-ratified peace treaty was
determinative, that Japan and the United States were still at "war,"
then the government of Japan would not have been entitled to sue
in a court of the United States." In urging the cause of the Japanese
government, the State Department pointed out that granting access
to United States courts would encourage Japanese commercial
growth, thereby reducing "the requirement for aid from the United
States." s
Generally, however, the State Department will not intervene in
favor of the international law and "popular" definition in opposition
to the constitutional definition advanced by another branch of the
executive. Consequently, the international law concept of "war" is
generally reflected in the decisions of United States courts only
inadvertently, in those instances where the courts, of their own
initiative, have chosen to ignore the constitutional definition in
favor of a "popular" one that happens to coincide with the realities of international law. The general rule, however, is that the
constitutional definition is adopted by the courts in cases involving
the application of public statutes 86 or in other cases affecting the
82. Id. at 264.
83. 101 F. Supp. 243 (S.D. N.Y. 1951).
84. "The strongest case would be one wherein the State of the forum was at war
with the State which desired to institute a proceeding. In such a case, it seems
clear that no duty could be laid upon the state of the forum to permit the institution
of a proceeding." Harvard Law School, Research in International Law, Competence
of Courts in Regard to Foreign States, 26 AM. J. INT'L L. 451, 504 (1932).
85. 101 F. Supp. 243, 246 (S.D. N.Y. 1951).
86. See, e.g., Ludecki v. Watkins, 335 U.S. 160 (1948); United States ex rel.
Krauff v. Watkins, 173 F.2d 599, 604 (2d Cir. 1949), aff'd sub nom., United States
ex. rel. Krauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537 (1950); Edwards v. Woods, 168 F.2d
827 (8th Cir. 1948); Arroyo v. Puerto Rico Public Transp. Authority, 164 F.2d
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public interest. On the other hand, the "popular" definition is frequently applied in cases involving private contracts, wills and other
non-public interests.8 7 Unfortunately for the systematizers, however,
the constitutional concept is sometimes adopted in cases involving
private interests,88 while the "popular" concept has, on occasion,
been adopted in litigation involving public statutes.89 In any event,
this public-private distinction has no logical relevance to the demands of international legal policy.
Generally, it is quite clear from a state's participation in or
abstention from military hostilities whether that state is at war for

purposes of international law. Where the national conduct is clear,
the international law notion has less need of evidentiary support
from the decisions of national tribunals. On the other hand, there
are twilight zones in the international law of war and peace in
which it may be extremely important for the state to speak with a
748 (1st Cir. 1947); United States ex rel. Schluler v. Watkins, 67 F. Supp. 556
(S.D. N.Y. 1946); Bowles v. Soverinsky, 65 F. Supp. 808 (E.D. Mich. 1946); Citizens
Protective League v. Byrnes, 64 F. Supp. 283 (D.D.C. 1946); State v. Gilessin,
258 Ala. 512, 64 So. 2d 75 (1953); Meier v. Schmidt, 150 Neb. 383, 34 N.W.2d
400 (1949).
87. Navios Corp. v. The Ulysses II, 161 F. Supp. 932 (D. Md. 1958) (charter
contract); Carius v. New York Life Ins. Co., 124 F. Supp. 388 (S.D. Ill. 1954) (life
insurance contract); Gaglormella v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 122 F. Supp. 246 (D.
Mass. 1954) (life insurance contract); Weissman v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 112
F. Supp. 420 (S.D. Cal. 1953) (life insurance contract); Zaccardo v. John Hancock
Mutual Life Ins. Co., 20 Conn. Supp. 75, 124 A.2d 926 (Super. Ct. 1956) (life
insurance contract); Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Davis, 79 Ga. App. 386, 53 S.E.2d
571 (1949) (life insurance contract); Gudewicz v. John Hancock Mutual Life Ins.
Co., 331 Mass. 752, 122 N.E.2d 900 (1954) (life insurance contract); Langlas v.
Iowa Life Ins. Co., 245 Ia. 713, 63 N.W.2d 885 (1954) (life insurance contract);
Darnall v. Day, 240 Ia. 665, 37 N.W.2d 277 (1949) (lease); Stankus v. New York
Life Ins. Co., 312 Mass. 366, 44 N.E.2d 687 (1942) (life insurance contract);
Lynch v. National Life & Ace. Ins. Co., 278 S.W.2d 32 (Mo. App. 1955) (life insurance contract); Stanbery v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 26 NJ. Super. 498, 98 A.2d
134 (N.J.L. 1953) (life insurance contract); Berg v. Berg, 13 N.J. Super. 479, 80
A.2d 584 (Ch. 1951) (will); Schaffer v. Oldak, 12 N.J. Super. 80, 78 A.2d
842 (Ch. 1951) (will); Wilkinson v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc., 2 Misc. 2d 249, 151
N.Y.S.2d 1018 (N.Y. Munic. Ct. 1956) (life insurance contract); Watkins v. Cohen,
91 N.E.2d 708 (Ohio C.P. 1949) (lease); Thomas v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.,
338 Pa. 499, 131 A.2d 600 (1957) (life insurance contract); Western Reserve
Life Ins. Co. v. Meadows, 152 Tex. 559, 261 S.W.2d 554 (1953) (life insurance
contract); Lincoln v. Harvey, 191 S.W.2d 764 (Tex. Civ. App. 1946) (lease);
Christensen v. Sterling Ins. Co., 46 Wash. 2d 713, 284 P.2d 287 (1955) (life insurance contract).
88. See, e.g., Savage v. Sun Life Assur. Co., 57 F. Supp. 620 (W.D. La. 1944);
Rosenau v. Idaho Mutual Benefit Ass'n, 65 Idaho 408, 145 P.2d 227 (1944); Harding
v. Pennsylvania Mutual Benefit Ass'n, 373 Pa. 270, 95 A.2d 221 (1953); Beley v.
Pennsylvania Mutual Life Benefit Ass'n, 373 Pa. 231, 95 A.2d 202 (1953); West
v. Palmetto State Life Ins. Co., 202 S.C. 422, 25 S.E.2d 475 (1943).
89. See, e.g., Hamilton v. McClaughry, 136 Fed. 445 (C.C.D. Kan. 1905); Miele
v. McGuire, 53 N.J. Super. 506, 147 A.2d 827 (L. 1959); Lefevre v. Healy, 92
N.H. 162, 26 A.2d 681 (1942); Cahan v. McNamara, 192 Misc. 453, 81 N.Y.S.2d
351 (Sup. Ct. 1948).
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single voice. These instances may arise in litigation over either
public or private interests, but should not be decided on the basis
of that distinction or by reference to either the constitutional or
the "popular" definition. Thus, the absence of continuing hostilities
at the end of a war may be peace in the "popular" sense, but in
international law the admission that the former protagonists are at
peace, even in the absence of a peace treaty, may make the occupying troops subject to the criminal and other laws of the defeated
state.9 0 Extremely damaging international legal repercussions may
also result from a judicial determination that a minor military
incident, or a policy like lend-lease, neither of which accord strictly
with some concepts of neutrality, amounted to "war."91 Obviously,
such a determination, ought not to be made in disregard of the
advice of the State Department.
Even in these relatively rare instances, however, State Department suggestions must be subject to the closest judicial scrutiny to
determine the bona fides of intervention. For example, in the recent
case of United States v. Bussoz, 2 the right of an alien to naturalization turned on a determination of the status of France with respect
to hostilities in 1943. The State Department intervened with a statement which was held to be conclusive by the lower court, to the
effect that, at the critical time, France was not a neutral. What
international law posture of the United States could possibly have
been served by such a suggestion? The court of appeals, quite
properly, decided that this was not, in 1952, an issue in which the
courts were bound to follow the Secretary of State. It said, "The
District Court was in error in assuming that the State Department
had any power or authority whatever to determine the status of
aliens under the Selective Service Act. It is of no moment what the
Secretary of State . . . opined." 93 There was no evidence that the
Secretary intervened to safeguard an international law position affecting the United States or for any purpose other than to assist one
of the parties to the dispute. On the contrary, as in The Ambrose
Light, there was evidence that the State Department, itself, had
previously determined the same question in abstracto and come to
the opposite conclusion.
90. See, e.g., In re Lo Dolce, 106 F. Supp. 455 (W.D. N.Y. 1952).
91. The closest a court has come to making such a determination is Stankus v.
New York Life Ins. Co., 312 Mass. 366, 44 N.E.2d 687 (1942). There the Massachusetts court held that the death of an insured while on convoy duty with the United
States Navy, prior to the United States' entry into World War II, was within the
terms of a life insurance policy excluding death resulting "directly or indirectly from
•
war.
92. 218 F.2d 683 (9th Cir. 1952).
93. Id. at 686.
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III. CONCLUSION

What emerges from the foregoing considerations is not a rule, but
a method. There is a good reason for co-ordinating the determinations of the various branches of government in important matters
of international law affecting the national interest. Therefore, in
'view of the primary concern of the political branches of government
with both the national interest and emergent international law, it is
right that the legal notions of the political branches of government
should be respected by the courts. On the other hand, there is no
reason for the courts to abdicate their function in deference to this
principle in those cases in which there is at stake no matter of international law substantially affecting the national interest. Particularly, the courts should restrict the tendency of the executive to take
over, in proceedings which lack procedural safeguards, the determination of an entire case merely because the case happens to have
an international law element.
Finally, it is for the courts to decide whether or not to accept
"suggestions," and to determine what effect to give these "suggestions." The courts should accede to such "suggestions" only where a
sufficient reason - the safeguarding of the national interest by preservation of the United States' posture in international law-has
been convincingly shown.

